Abstract-Information leaks through side channels are a pervasive problem in security-critical applications. Functional side channels arise when an attacker knows that the secret value of a server stays fixed for a certain time, and can observe the server executes on a sequence of different public inputs, each paired with the same secret input. Thus for each secret, the attackers observe a (partial) function from public values to (for instance) running time, and they can compare these functions for different secrets. First, we define a notion of noninterference for functional side channels. We focus on the case of noisy observations, where we demonstrate on examples that there is a practical functional side channel in programs that would be deemed information-leak-free using the standard definition. Second, we develop a framework and techniques for debugging programs for functional side channels. We adapt existing results and algorithms in functional data analysis (such as functional clustering) to discover the existence of side channels. We use a functional extension of standard decision tree learning to pinpoint the code fragments causing a side channel if there is one. Finally, we empirically evaluate the performance of our tool FUSCHIA on a series of micro-benchmarks, as well as on realistic Java programs with thousands of methods. FUSCHIA is able to discover (and locate in the code) functional side channels, including one that was since fixed by the original developers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Side-channel attacks are practical and widespread [1] , [2] , [3] . A side channel arises if the attacker can infer the value of secret inputs (or some of their properties) based on public inputs, runtime observations, and the source code of the program. A typical example is an online pharmacy, where based on the number of rounds of interaction and the processing time, an eavesdropper can infer a user's prescriptions on file.
We consider the setting where the secret input stays fixed across a number of interactions. This gives rise to functional observations: for a secret input, we observe the program on a number of public inputs. For a secret input s, we thus obtain a partial function f s from public inputs to runtime observations. In this paper, we focus on timing side channels, where the attacker observes the running time of the program. However, our methods apply to other types of side channels equally well. Functional side channels. We adapt the classical definition of noninterference to functional side channels, where two secret inputs s and t are indistinguishable for the attacker if the functions f s and f t are equal. However, in the presence of noise (a common situation for timing measurements), we cannot require an exact equality of functions. Instead, we define two functional observations to be indistinguishable when the distance between them is small. We show on examples that it is critical to choose the distance that corresponds to the characteristics of the environment noise, otherwise side channels might be undetected.
Problem. We focus on automatically discovering functional timing side channels in programs, and on pinpointing code regions that contribute to creating the side channel. Algorithms. As functional timing side channels are hard to detect statically, and are clearly beyond the scope of current program analysis tools, we turn to dynamic analysis methods. We build on the results and algorithms from the theory of functional data analysis. We use functional data clustering to find timing side channels and estimate their strength. It allows us to compute an equivalence relation on secret inputs that models the distinguishing power of the attacker. If this relation has multiple equivalence classes, there is an information leak. In order to find what parts of the code caused the leak, we identify what properties are common for secrets in the same cluster (equivalence class), and what separates the clusters. We consider the properties to be program internals such as methods called or basic blocks executed for a given secret value. We present a functional extension of decision tree inference techniques to identify code regions that explain differences among clusters. These code regions are thus suspect of being a root cause of the functional side channel. Experiments. We evaluate our techniques on microbenchmarks and on seven larger case studies. The case studies serve to evaluate scalability and performance on real-world applications. These programs have up to thousands of methods, and we show that our tool is able to find side channels, and pinpoint their cause in the code in under 2 minutes. Contributions. Our main contributions are:
• Definition of functional noninterference in the presence of noisy observations. We demonstrate functional side channels in programs that would be deemed informationleak-free using the standard (non-functional) definition.
• Algorithms: We adapt existing theory and algorithms for functional data clustering to discover the existence of side channels. We develop a functional extension of decision tree learning to locate the code regions causing a side channel if there is one.
• Evaluation: we show on microbenchmarks and larger case studies that FUSCHIA (FUnctional Side CHannel Investgator and Analyzer) is able to scalably discover (and locate in the code) functional side channels, including one that was since fixed by the original developers.
II. OVERVIEW
First, we illustrate what an attacker can infer based on functional observations, even in the presence of noise. Second, we show how our tool FUSCHIA can help in detecting such functional side channels.
A. Illustrating functional side channels
We consider the setting of server programs with public and secret variables. We focus on the (very common) situation where secret values stay constant for some amount of time (e.g., number of friends a person has on a social network). The eavesdropper can try to infer the secret value by observing public parts of a number of client requests and server responses (for instance, number of packets sent, and their size, can be publicly observable). Note that in our setting, the eavesdropper does not choose public values-these are chosen by the legitimate users that the eavesdropper observes.
Let us consider the classical definition of confidentiality:-noninterference. A program is unsafe iff for all pairs of secret values s 1 and s 2 , there exists a public value p such that the behavior of the program on (s 1 , p) is observably different than on (s 2 , p). If our observable is the running time T , then:
In our setting, however, we have functional data. For each secret value, we observe the running time of a program on a number of public values, and the noninterference then becomes: ∀s 1 , s 2 : (λp.T (s 1 , p)) = (λp.T (s 2 , p)). In other words, the program is unsafe if the two secret values do not correspond to the same (partial) function of public inputs.
Side channels in the presence of noise. Quantitative observations of a program's runtime behavior are often noisy. For instance, running the same program twice on the same machine results in different measurements of running time. Observing the program remotely adds further level of noise. Classical definitions of confidentiality properties therefore need to be adapted to noisy environments. In the noisy environment, no two observations are equal, and our definition needs to include ε tolerance:
In this definition, d is a distance between two functions. The distance is suitably chosen, typically based on the noise expected for a particular use case. For instance, to recover (the spirit of) the classical definition, we can use the distance:
However, we now demonstrate that the distance d point is not the only option, and that depending on the type of noise, different distances are needed. In particular, we show that if we use distance d point , we could certify a program to be safe even though some secret information leaks. a) Gaussian noise (pointwise independent, mean 0): Consider the two functional observations (red and black) of a program in Figure 1 . On the x-axis, we have public values, and on y-axis, there is the running time. The red function corresponds to secret value s 1 and the black function corresponds to secret value s 2 . The eavesdropper can produce this graph easily by trying all possible inputs on their machine before hand. At runtime, the eavesdropper collects the public inputs and the running time, and tries to learn the secret by matching the observed data to the red or black functions.
In this example, we assume that the noise for each pair of public-secret inputs is independent and identically distributed to the noise for other inputs, and furthermore we assume that it is distributed according to the Gaussian distribution with mean 0. Let us consider ε of 3ms, and then apply our definition with distance d point . We see that that the two functional observations are ε-close for this distance, so the attacker cannot infer the secret value (s 1 or s 2 ).
However, the functional observations are clearly very different, and an eavesdropper can reliably learn the secret if there are many observations. Theoretically, this can be captured for instance by considering the distance to be the L 1 norm between the two functions, that is, the sum (integral) of the absolute value of the difference of the two functions over an interval of interest. Practically, this example shows that considering the supremum of the point-wise distance (d point ) is insufficient to detect all side channels, as the eavesdropper learns from all inputs they see, not just one of them.
b) Gaussian noise (pointwise independent, mean C): Let us consider the case where the noise is again Gaussian, but with a non-zero mean. The threat model we consider is that the mean is fixed but unknown to the attacker. This case arises for instance if the eavesdropper is remote, and cannot determine reliably the delay introduced by the network and separate it from the noise caused by the remote machine.
Consider a program with two possible functional behaviors (red and black) pictured in Figure 2 (a) , where the red behavior corresponds to secret value s 1 and the black behavior to secret value s 2 . Note that the attacker can obtain this graph by running the program for many inputs on their own machine.
At runtime, the attacker interacts with the remote server running the same instance of the application with a fixed secret value. The green timing function in Figure 2 Green function looks far apart from both local observations (black and red functions in Figure 2 (a) ). However, due to the effect of remote observations, the attacker knows that the observation of running time is off by an unknown constant.
Therefore, the attacker is in effect observing only the shape of the function, i.e., its first derivative. The appropriate distance is therefore over the derivatives of the functions, for instance the L 2 -norm of the difference of the two functions, as used in the literature [4] , [5] to calculate the distance between green function with red and black functions. The eavesdropper can use this distance to calculate that the green function is closer to the black function than the red function (and if the difference is greater than ε, the value of the secret leaks).
We have shown situations where the distance is the L 1 norm, or the L 2 norm over the first derivative of the functions. In general, in this paper we will consider distances that are given by p-norms over k-th derivatives of functions.
B. Debugging functional side channels with FUSCHIA 1) Using FUSCHIA to debug Eclipse Jetty: We illustrate how our tool FUSCHIA can be used for discovering and explaining information leaks arising due to functional side channels. We analyze the Jetty.util.security package of Eclipse Jetty web server. The package has Credential class which had a timing side channel. This vulnerability was analyzed in [6] and fixed initially in [7] . Then, the developers noticed that the implementation in [7] can leak still leak information and fixed this issue with a new implementation [8] . We consider this new implementation and apply FUSCHIA to check its security. The final fix was done few months later [9] (but before we reported our finding to the developers). Problem. The secret input is the password stored at the server, the public input is the guess by the user. The goal of the defender is to determine whether an attacker can infer properties of the (unchanging) secret if the attacker can observe the timing for many public inputs. FUSCHIA helps with this, and helps the user pinpoint the problematic code. Side channel discovery. The defender starts by choosing a finite set of secret and public values. For this example, the defender uses libFuzzer [10] , a popular evolutionary fuzzer. The defender chooses 800 different secret passwords and 800 different guesses (ordered by length). The lengths of passwords are at most 20 characters. For each secret value, FUSCHIA varies 800 different guesses and measures the ex- The defender provides the notion of a distance and the bound ε. In this case, we consider L points between the first derivatives, and the bound ε = 0.001. FUSCHIA discovers 20 classes of observations. Figure 4 (b) shows 20 clusters detected by FUSCHIA. Since every cluster corresponds to a distinct class of observation, the defender concludes that there are 20 classes of observations in Jetty util.security package that leak information about the secret via side channels. Side channel explanation. Now, the defender wants to know what properties of program internal leak through the timing side channel and use this information for further analysis such as elimination of the leaks. FUSCHIA helps the defender with inferring what properties are common for secrets in the same cluster, and what separates the clusters. We look at program internals such as methods called or basic blocks executed during the executions with a given secret value. This part is done by extending techniques from [11] , [12] to functional setting. It produces a decision tree whose nodes are labeled by program internal features, and whose leaves represent sets of secret values inside a cluster. Figure 4 (c) shows the decision tree model learned for Jetty. Using this model, the defender realizes that the executions of stringEquals_bblock_118 is what distinguishes the clusters from each other. This basic block represents the loop body of the for loop in the method shown in Figure 3 . For instance, the green cluster (third from the bottom of the center diagram, bottom of the right diagram) corresponds to the case where stringEquals_bblock_118 is executed 3 times. More specifically, the cluster corresponds to the case where if the length of public input (user-provided password) is less than 3, stringEquals_bblock_118 is the length of public input, and if the length is greater than or equal to 3, stringEquals_bblock_118 is 3. Since the functions labeled with L 3 are obtained for the secret values with the length of 3, the defender realizes that the minimum of the lengths of the secret password and the user-provided password is correlated with the number of execution of the loop (or the basic block) inside stringEquals, and the minimum of the lengths is leaking through this basic block. Note that defender could establish this as FUSCHIA pinpointed the right function. Remote observation. Now assume that the attacker has the same version of Jetty application and performs analysis similar to the one performed by the defender on his local machine. Consequently, the attacker has obtained the same Figures in 4. Now, on the remote machine that runs the same instance of jetty, the attacker wants to guess the length of the (fixed) password. The attacker sends the same guesses as his local analysis over the network and observes the execution time. The new remote observation is shown with green function in Figure 4 (a). Now, to get rid of additive noise effects, the attacker considers the first derivative of timing models and finds the closet cluster to green function among the discovered clusters. Figure 4 ( The attacker correctly recognizes that the timing observations (green function) belong to pink cluster (the middle cluster) using the distances between the first derivative of timing functions. (c) Learned decision tree model. Number of calls to stringEquals_bblock_118 (basic block at line 118 of stringEquals) discriminates different classes of observations.
this cluster corresponds to passwords with the length 10, the attacker correctly discovers the length of password running on the remote machine is 10.
2) Inside FUSCHIA: We describe how FUSCHIA produces the diagrams. To produce the middle diagram of Figure 4 , FUSCHIA converts the execution time of secret values over public guesses to timing functions in the domain of the public guesses for each secret value using B-spline basis [13] . Then, it applies a functional data clustering algorithm to discover different classes of observations in time (described in Section IV). This clustering algorithm is non-parametric functional clustering [4] that works in two steps: first, it applies the L-norm distance function over every pair of functions to summarize the distance between them in a distance matrix, and then it uses constrained clustering algorithms to group similar functions together (described in V-A).
For explaining the clusters and producing the decision tree in the right diagram of Figure 4 , FUSCHIA executes an instrumented version of the program with Javassist [14] on the same inputs as before and obtains the basic blocks taken for each secret value over the public input values. Therefore, for each secret value, the evaluation of a basic block is a function in the domain of public input. We label the functions with categorical values and use off-the-shelf decision tree learning algorithm. The tool learns a decision tree model that discriminates each cluster of timing functions based on the basic block calls (described in Section IV).
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We develop a framework for detecting and explaining information leaks due to execution time of programs and we focus leaks due to functional observations by the attacker.
A. Threat Model
We assume that the attacker has access to the source code of the application and she can sample execution-times for the application arbitrarily many times on her local machine with different combinations of secret and public values. As a result, she can infer an arbitrarily accurate model of the application's true execution time. During an attack, the attacker intends to guess a fixed secret by observing the application on a remote machine. These remote observations, however, may not correspond to the timing model inferred by the attacker because of several factors, such as, i) network delays and noises, and ii) masking delays added by the administrator to every response (potentially as a function of public inputs) to mitigate the side channel. We assume that the attacker knows an upper bound on the mitigation model, but she does not know the specific model parameters.
B. Timing Model and Functional Observations
Let R and R ≥0 be the set of reals and positive reals. Variables with unspecified types are assumed to be real-valued. • X= {x 1 , . . . , x n } is the set of secret-input variables, • Y = {y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y m } is the set of public-input variables, • Σ ⊆ R n is a finite set of secret-inputs, and
is the execution-time function of the program as a function of secret and public inputs. a) Functional observations: A functional observation of the program P for a secret input s ∈ Σ is the function δ(s) defined as y ∈ R m → δ(s, y). Let F be the set of all functional observations. In order to characterize indistinguishability between two functional observations, we introduce a distance function d i,p : F × F → R ≥0 on functional observations, for i, p ∈ N, defined as:
where f (i) represents i-th derivative (wrt y) of the function f and 0-th derivative is the function itself. The distance function d i,p corresponds to the p-norm distance between i-th derivatives of the functional observations. Given ε > 0, we say that secrets s and s are ε-indistinguishable (or indistinguishable when ε is clear from context) if
Depending upon the context, as we argued in the previous section, different distance functions (and different bounds ε) may be applicable. For instance, the distance between first derivatives may be applicable when the shape of the functional observation is leaking information about the secret (while observations themselves may be arbitrarily close) and the second derivatives may be applicable when the number of growth spurts in the observations is leaking information. Similarly, in the situations where the attacker knows the mitigation model-say temporal noises added to the signal are n-th order polynomials of the public inputs-two functional observations whose n-th derivatives are close in the p-norm sense may be indistinguishable to the attacker. Finally, depending upon the specific situation, an analyst may wish to use more nuanced notion of distance by taking a weighted combination [15] of various distance functions characterized by d i,p . To keep the technical discourse simple, we will not formally introduce such weighted combinations in this paper. b) Noninterference: Noninterference is a wellestablished [16] , [17] , [18] criterion to guarantee absence of side-channel vulnerabilities. A program P is said to satisfy the noninterference property if:
To account for the measurement noises in the observation of the execution-time, it is prudent (see, e.g., [6] ) to relax the notion of noninterference from exact equality in timing observations to a parameterized neighborhood. For a given ε>0, a program P satisfies ε-approximate noninterference if:
We adapt the notion of ε-approximate noninterference in our setting of functional observations by generalizing previous notions of noninterference. We say that a program satisfies functional ε-approximate noninterference if
where d i,p is a distance function over functional observations defined earlier. For the rest of the paper we assume a fixed distance function d over functional observations. c) Quantifying Information Leakage: The notion of noninterference requires that the attacker should deduce nothing about the secret inputs from observing execution time for various public inputs. However, one can argue that achieving noninterference is neither possible nor desirable, because oftentimes programs need to reveal information that depends on the secret inputs. We therefore need a notion of information leakage. Shannon entropy, guessing entropy, and min-entropy are three prevalent information metrics [19] to quantify information leakage in programs. Number of distinguishable observations provide a practical upper-bound [20] , [21] on the information leakage. In this paper, we use the number of distinguishable functional observation clusters as a yardstick for quantitative information leaks.
IV. DATA-DRIVEN DISCOVERY AND EXPLANATION The space of program inputs are often too large (potentially infinite) to exhaustively explore even for mediumsized programs. This necessitates a data-driven approach for discovery and explanation of functional side channels. In the proposed approach, an analyst provides a set of interesting secret and public input pairs (using domain knowledge or fuzzing techniques), and our tool estimates the executiontime of the program. The tool exploits functional clustering approaches to discover functional side channels. To explain any discovered side channels, our tool instruments the program to print information about auxiliary variables (e.g., predicates on secrets and public variables, number of times a method called, value of some internal variables, number of execution of a block) for each pair of inputs. To summarize: given such set of program traces, the key computational problems are a) to cluster traces exhibiting distinguishable timing behaviors (discovery) and b) to explain these differences by exploiting richer information based on program internals. Hyper-trace Learning. Let Z = {z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z r } be the set of auxiliary variables. An execution trace of a program P is a tuple (x, y, z, t) ∈ R n × R m × R r × R wherein x ∈ Σ ⊂ R n is a value to the secret inputs, y ∈ R m is a value to the public inputs, and z ∈ R r and t ∈ R ≥0 are the valuations to the auxiliary variables and estimated execution time, respectively, of the program for secret and public input pairs. We further assume that the valuations of the auxiliary variables deterministically depend only on the secret and public inputs. To keep execution-time unaffected from the instrumentation process, we assume that executiontime for traces is estimated for un-instrumented program. Let T be a set of execution traces.
As our main objective is to explain the differences on functional observations due to differences on secret and auxiliary variables, we rearrange the raw execution traces T to functional traces H by combining traces with common values of secret inputs. Functional traces H are hyper-traces-as they summarize multiple program executions-that model auxiliary and timing values as a function of public inputs. A hypertrace τ is a tuple (x, (f i (x))
wherein x is a value to the secret input, f i and f T are functions modeling values of auxiliary variables z i and execution times, respectively, as a function of public inputs for secret x. Computation of hyper-traces from a set of raw-traces is achieved by turning the discrete vectors of observations (for auxiliary variables as well as execution time) into smooth functions represented as linear combinations of appropriate basis functions (e.g. B-spline basis system, Fourier basis functions, and polynomial bases) [22] . In our tool, we primarily uses B-spline basis functions.
of hyper-traces, we use functional clustering over T = {f T (x j )} N j=1 to detect different classes of functional observations such that hypertraces within a cluster are closer according to the distance function d than hyper-traces from different clusters. Functional clustering approaches [23] can be broadly classified into non-parametric and model-based approaches. Our tool uses non-parametric functional clustering and implements two algorithms to cluster indistinguishable observations. These algorithms-described in Section V-A-take the timing observations set T , an upper bound K on the number of clusters, a distance function d, and the indistinguishability distance ε > 0 as inputs, and returns the "centroids" of observational functions F = {f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f k } for k ≤ K. Our algorithm guarantees that each centroid f i ∈ F represents the timing functions for the set of secret values Σ i such that x, x ∈ Σ i if and only if d(f T (x), f T (x )) ≤ ε. Side-Channel Explanation. A (hyper) trace discriminant is defined as a disjoint partitioning of the product of the secret variables and auxiliary variables functional spaces along with a functional observations for each partition that models the execution time as a function of public inputs. Formally, a trace discriminant Ψ = (F, Φ) is a set of functional observations F = {f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f k }-where each f j : R m → R ≥0 models the execution time as a function of the public input variablesand a partition Φ = φ 1 , φ 2 , . . . , φ k where each φ j :
r → {T, F} is a predicate over secret inputs and functions of auxiliary variables. We define size(Ψ) as the total number of functions in the discriminant Ψ.
Given a hyper-trace τ =(x, (f i )
, f T ) and discriminant Ψ=(F, Φ), we define the prediction error e(τ, Ψ) as d(f T , f j ) where 1≤j≤k is the index of the unique value in Ψ such that (x, (f i ) r i=1 ) |= φ j i.e. the predicate φ j evaluates to true for the valuation of secret value x and the auxiliary function
, and a discriminant Ψ, we define the fitness of the discriminant as the mean of prediction errors: µ(H, Ψ) = 1/N N i=1 e(τ (x j ), Ψ). Definition IV.1 (Discriminant Learning Problem). Given a set of hyper traces H, a bound on the size of the discriminant K ∈ N, a bound on the error ε ∈ R, the discriminant learning problem is to find a discriminant Ψ = (F, Φ) with size(Ψ) ≤ K and prediction error µ(H, Ψ) ≤ ε.
It follows from Theorem 1 in [24] that the discriminant learning problem is NP-HARD. For this reason we propose a practical solution to the discriminant learning problem by exploiting functional data clustering and decision tree learning.
For learning discriminant model, we adapt decision tree learning algorithm by converting various functional datavalues into categorical variables. For the auxiliary variable observations (x, (f i (x))) r i=1 of a secret x ∈ Σ, our algorithm clusters each auxiliary variable into k groups by employing functional clustering [23] 
shows secret value x and categorical auxiliary variable L i = 
, f j ) with r categorical auxiliary variables and the timing function label f j ∈ F, the decision tree learning algorithms provide an efficient way to learn hyper-trace discriminants.
V. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
We refer to Algorithm 1 to illustrate the inputs, the output, and the different steps of FUSCHIA. Given the program P, the procedure ExecTime extracts execution time over the public Algorithm 1: FUSCHIA TOOL Input: Program P, the instrumented version P , secret and public inputs Σ, Π, cluster bound K, distance function d, and bound ε. Output: Functional clusters and a decision tree.
input for each secret input value. The procedure ExecAux produces the internal properties of P (method calls and basic block executions) by executing the same input as ExecTime procedure using the instrumented version of the program (P ). Given the output of ExecTime, an upper bound on the number of clusters, and the distance picked by the user, FDClustering discovers classes of observations and returns the clusters F = f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f k . Each cluster f i includes a set of timing functions (corresponds to a set of secret values). The procedure DiscLearning learns a set of discriminant predicates φ 1 , φ 2 , . . . , φ k .
A. Implementation
We describe the implementation of each component in Algorithm 1. All timing measurements in ExecTime of Algorithm 1 is conducted on an Intel NUC5i5RYH. All other components in Algorithm 1 are conducted on an Intel i5-2.7 GHz machine with 8 GB memory. Overall Details. We use functional data analysis library [13] to create B-spline basis and fit functions to the vector of timing and auxiliary variable observations. We use Javassist [25] to produce P and obtain a set of auxiliary variable vector Z for each secret. Given an upper-bound K on the number of clusters as well as an arbitrary distance function d with the indistinguishably distances ε, we implement FDClustering to discover k classes of observations (k ≤ K). This clustering is an instantiation of non-parametric functional clustering [4] . Using the auxiliary variables as features and the functional clusters as labels, we apply CART decision tree in scikit-learn library [26] to implement DiscLearning. FDClustering. We use two algorithms for clustering: hierarchal [27] and constrained K-means [28] . Preparation. We obtain timing functions from the discrete timing vector. Then, we use a given distance function d to obtain the distance matrix D that includes distance between any timing functions. We specify cannot-link constrains over the matrix D. Cannot-link constraints disallow two functions that are more than ε far to be in the same cluster. constrained K-means. Given the upper bound K over the number of observational classes (K is less than number of secret values), constrained K-means algorithm [29] obtains k clusters in each iteration (k = 1 in the first iteration). If the algorithm could not find k clusters with the given cannot constraints, it increases k to k + 1 and runs the algorithm again (if k <= K). Otherwise, it returns cluster object F = f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f k . It has been known that constrained K-means with cannot-link constraints is computationally intractable [30] . Constrained K-means algorithm internally uses constraints to discover clusters. Hierarchical clustering. The clustering algorithm with complete link method [31] obtains k clusters in each iteration (k = 1 in the first iteration). In each iteration, after clustering, it checks that all pairs in cannot-link are in different clusters. If the condition is not satisfied, it increases k to k + 1 and run the algorithm again (if k <= K). Otherwise, it returns F = f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f k . Hierarchical clustering is agnostic to constraints and the constraints are verified after the clustering. Non-functional clustering. We extend the well-establish noninterference implementation [32] to our setting with quantified discovery of leaks. For every public input value, we form cannot-link constrains and apply one of the clustering algorithm with the infinity norm and an indistinguishably distance ε. Finally, we choose the largest number of clusters among all values of the public input. DiscLearning. For each secret value, the evaluation of an auxiliary variable is a function in the domain of public input. We use B-spline functions to represent the auxiliary functions in general, but we also allow to fit simpler functions such polynomial functions. Then, we cluster the functions and use the decision tree model to learn discriminant formulas.
B. Micro-benchmarks
We design synthetic micro-benchmarks to compare the two clustering algorithms, evaluate the scalability of FUSCHIA, and compare results (in term of discovered clusters) for functional and non-functional clustering algorithms. Programs. Two programs Zigzag and processBid are shown in Figure 5 . Two versions of guess secret applications are considered. The applications Guess Secret 1 [33] and Guess Secret 2 [34] (shown in Figure 5 ) take the secret and guess as the inputs and execute different sleep commands depending on the values of secret and guess. Six versions of branch and loop are considered. One of these versions is shown in Figure 5 We use the symbols K and T similar to the indistinguishably distance symbol to show the number of observations, and the computation time of the clustering algorithms for different distance models and norms. Clustering Comparison. We compare two functional clustering algorithms proposed in Section V-A. Figure 6 shows the comparison between hierarchical and constrained K-means algorithms for Branch and Loop benchmarks. In particular, the comparison shows that constrained K-means is computationally expensive, while the hierarchical clustering is much more scalable. In addition, it shows that the constrained Kmeans discovers more classes of observations than hierarchical clustering. Note that the clusters discovered by both algorithms are valid, and we prefer the one with lower number of clusters. Scalability. We examine the scalability of FUSCHIA for applications with different sizes of micro-benchmark such as the number of recorded features and different sizes of experiments such as the number of secret and public values. To learn decision trees, we consider the largest number of observational classes among all the clustering parameters and evaluate the accuracy of tree models with 20-fold crossvalidation procedure. Table I shows the result of evaluations for different micro-benchmarks. We can see that FUSCHIA can handle programs with 100 classes of observations and complex decision tree models in a reasonable amount of time. In the worst case, it takes less than 30 seconds to cluster timing functions. In addition, it takes less than a second to learn the decision tree model. For the branch and loop applications, the computation time is growing in linear factor with respect to the size of applications and the size of experiments. For Branch and Loop 6 application, it takes less than 25 seconds to compute the clusters and learn decision tree models where we have 24,192 test cases with a decision tree model that has 48 unique leaves and the height of 92. Clustering results. We evaluate the effects of the timing models and the distance norm over the number of discovered classes of observations. Table I shows that the non-functional clustering accepts the security of Zigzag (found one cluster) while the first derivative functional model rejects the security of the application (found two clusters). In addition, in the case of Guess Secret 1, Guess Secret 2, and processBid, the functional clustering discovers that there are more classes of observations than the ones discovered by non-functional clustering. We can also see how the number of observations are changing based on the timing functions and the distance norm. For example, there are 8 classes of observations for Branch and Loop 2 using the timing functions, while there are 6 clusters using the first derivate of timing functions. Table II summarizes seven real-world Java applications used as case studies in this paper. Table II is similar to Table I in Section V-B. Here, we consider functional observations (with indistinguishability bound ε) and the first derivative of functional timing models with 2-norm distance (with indistinguishability bound ε 1 ). The main research questions is the following: Do functional clustering and decision tree learning scale well and pinpoint code fragments related to leaks? A) GabFeed. Gabfeed is a Java web application with 573 methods implementing a chat server [6] . The server takes users' public key (public input) and its own private key (secret input) to generate a common key. Inputs. The defender chooses a finite set of secret values and public values. For this example, he randomly chooses 1,105 server's private keys and 65 user public keys (uniformly spread through the space of keys). In total, he uses 71,825 test cases. Leakages. For each private key, FUSCHIA varies public keys and measures the execution time of the server to generate the common key ( Fig. 7 (a) ). Next, FUSCHIA creates timing functions from the discrete timing observations and discovers 34 classes of observations with ε = 0.1 (Fig. 7 (b) ). Explanation. On the instrumented GabFeed, for each secret value, FUSCHIA fits functions for each auxiliary variable. Figure 7 (c) shows the decision tree model learned for GabFeed. Using this model, he realizes that the number of basic block calls at line 18 of standardMultiply method explains different classes of observations. The basic block executes expensive shift left and add operations over BigIntegers. The split value in the decision tree model is linear function of the public input with different slopes. The functions are linear since the basic block is triggered as the number of set bits in the public key, and the slope of functions are determined by the number of calls to the standardMultiply method that depends on the number of set bits in the secret key minus one. This vulnerability is an instance of timing leaks in the square-and-multiply algorithm [1] . Mitigation. The clustering over the first derivative timing functions found 32 classes of observations with ε 1 = 0.01. This indicates the leaks over the shape of functions for remote attackers. Let's assume the defender quantizes (mitigates) execution time [35] where the mitigator releases the events at certain times like {4.5,9,13.5,. . . }. Figure 7 (d) shows 27 classes of observations discovered after applying this mitigator. Highlights. The decision tree model explains the calls to an expensive basic block is linear function of public input where the slope depends on the secret inputs. The clustering over mitigated observations shows a slight reduction in the strength of leaks. The overall algorithm takes less than 75 seconds. B) SnapBuddy. SnapBuddy is a mock social network application where each user has their own pages with a photograph [36] , [11] . In this application, the public profile is public input, and the identity of users is secret input. Inputs. The defender considers 447 users in the system (with secret identity) and changes the size of profile images as the Explanation. Figure 8 (c) shows (part of) the decision tree model that says users who do not apply any filter on their images follow black cluster (the bottom cluster in Figure 8 (b)), while those apply oilFilter on their images are assigned to red cluster (the top cluster in Figure 8 (b) ). Mitigation. FUSCHIA discovers 24 classes of observations with ε 1 = 0.5 over the first derivative functions. The defender also uses the basic double scheme mitigator [35] that predicts the execution time at i−th slot of N −th epoch with
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where t N is the start time of the N −th epoch (t 0 = 4). Figure 8 (d) shows 10 classes of observations discovered for a remote attacker after applying the double scheme mitigation with ε 1 = 0.5. Highlights. The defender finds out filters can leak the identity of users. In addition, the defender realizes that applying basic double scheme reduces the strength of leaks. The clustering and decision tree algorithms take less than 5 seconds. C) Share Value. Share value application is the functional extension of classical share value program studied in [37] , [38] . In this case, every user in the system has two types of shares: public and private shares. Inputs. The program has 63 users each with maximum 400 private shares. The user can have 1 to 400 public shares. Leakages. FUSCHIA discovers 29 classes of observations with ε = 0.01 as shown in Figure 9 (a). The clustering algorithm takes less than 1 second. Explanation. Figure 9 (b) shows decision tree model that says different intervals of calls to the remote data base cause the leaks. The decision tree learning takes less than 1 second.
Mitigation. The defender sets the values of ε 1 to be 0.005, and FUSCHIA obtains 13 classes of observations over the first derivatives. The defender also mitigates the leaks with permitting the response times to occur at {1,2,3,etc}, and FUSCHIA discovers 12 classes of observations with ε 1 = 0.005. D) PowerBroker. PowerBroker is a peer-to-peer program used by power suppliers for exchanging power [39] . During the connection setup, there is a step where the two peers exchange RSA public keys. Inputs. The defender chooses 8 secret inputs (RSA Keys) and 2,048 public inputs (messages need to be decrypted) using AFL fuzzer [40] and the domain knowledges. Leakages. FUSCHIA takes the indistinguishable distances ε 1 = 0.1 and discovers three classes of observations over the first derivative of timing functions as shown in Figure 9 (c). The clustering algorithm takes less than 90 seconds. Explanation. Figure 9(d) shows the decision tree model learned for PowerBroker that pinpoints the basic block at line 97 of montgomeryMultiply method discriminates green cluster from other two clusters. The decision tree learning takes less than 1 second. PowerBroker uses the Chinese Remainder Theorem based on the implementation in [41] that can leak secret keys using attacks such as [42] . E) Collab. Collab is a scheduling application that allows users to create new events and modify existing events [43] . An audit events is a secret, while other events are public. Inputs. The defender considers 176 users each has either no or one audit event. The defender consider 11 operations (combination of add and commit) over public events. Leakages. FUSCHIA discovers only one cluster for both timing functions and the first derivative of timing functions with ε and ε 1 to be as small as 0.001. In this example, given the input traces (finite sets of public and secret values), the defender concludes that the program is not leaking any information. The clustering algorithm takes less than 1 second. F) Password Checker. We consider a password checker that uses string equality checker from [44] .
Inputs. The defender uses libFuzzer [10] that generates 21,123 guesses for 10 randomly selected password. We assume the length of password is at most 6 lower-case alphabet. Leakages. FUSCHIA discovers 4 classes of observations for both timing functions and the first derivative of timing functions where ε = 0.001 and ε 1 = 0.001. The clustering algorithm takes less than 1 second. Explanation. The number of basic block at the entry of the loop that compares the candidate and password strings explain different classes of observations. The decision tree learning takes less than 1 second.
VII. RELATED WORK Noninterference. Noninterference was first introduced by Goguen and Meseguer [16] and has been widely used to enforce confidentiality properties in various systems [17] , [18] , [45] . The work [6] defines ε bounded noninterference that requires the resource usage behavior of the program executed from the same public inputs differ at most ε. The functional noninterference allows us to consider various notion of distance norms on noise models and mitigation policies. Detection of information leaks. Various techniques have been used to detect information leaks [46] , [32] , [6] . Molnar et al. [32] propose program transcript model to detect timing side channels. This model captures a class of side-channel attacks in which the adversary can see the entire control-flow. Molnar et al. [32] do not quantify classes of observations. Quantification of information leaks. The amount of information leakage can be estimated based on quantitative information flow techniques [19] , [47] , [46] . The works [20] , [21] give an upper bound on the amount of information leakage based on side-channel observations. In particular, Köpf and Dürmuth [20] prove that the amount of information leakage is bounded from above by |O|log 2 (n + 1) bits, where O is the number of distinct classes of observations, and n is the number of measurements by the attacker. Our clustering algorithm uses this bound to show the strength of leaks. Hardening against timing side channels. Previous works study methods to eliminate timing leaks [37] , [48] , [49] and to mitigate timing side channels [20] , [35] , [50] . The work [35] introduces different schemes to mitigate timing side channels. We use these schemes in our functional setting to show possible classes of observations after the mitigation. Statistical Learning for program performance analysis. Machine learning techniques have been used for detecting and explaining performance bugs in software [11] , [12] , [51] . Tizpaz-Niari et al. [12] consider performance issues in softwares. They also cluster execution times of programs and then explain what properties of program distinguish the different functional clusters. Their work is limited to linear functions as it needs to discover functions, while we support arbitrary functions . Further, they analyze performance, while we focus on confidentiality. Time series have been used for profiling and failure detection [52] , [53] , [54] , [55] . In particular, Hauswirth et al. [53] group the traces of the same input together. If there is a pattern like sudden instruction-percycle changes, they align all executions using dynamic time warping (DTW) [56] and apply statistical correlation to find properties that are linked to the changes. In contrast, we use (different forms of) functional data analysis for confidentiality.
